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PROFITS, POVERTY, AND HEALTH CARE:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ETHICAL BASE
OF ECONOMICS
Robert J. Brent*
Introduction
Economics involves the allocation of scarce resources to compet-
ing ends. The main way by which resources are allocated in econo-
mies is through private markets. Markets perform their allocative
function by highlighting where scarcity exists. Prices will be high
when shortages exist. High prices indicate that profits can be
earned by producing more of the scarce good. Profit, therefore, is
the reward for removing the shortage. In this way, the market
price system and the profit motive are inextricably linked.
Although profits perform this positive function, there is also an
inherent problem with how the poor gain access to resources
within a market system. High profits are reflections of a strong
willingness to pay for a good or service by consumers. However,
the poor have a low ability to pay, which constrains what they are
willing to pay. In the end, it seems that profits respond only to the
shortages of goods demanded by the rich.
The fact that the poor are not able to consume a particular good
need not necessarily imply that there is a social problem with how
markets function. Much depends on the type of good or service
being denied. It need not be a social problem that the poor cannot
buy Rolls Royces. There would be social concern, however, if
something considered vital, like health care, is involved. Hence, it
is important to examine, in the context of health care, the ethical
base' of the profit motive. Then, one can try to understand the
extent to which the profit motive can, with and without the help of
the government's visible hand, be responsive to the needs of the
poor.
* Professor, Department of Economics, Fordham University, Bronx, NY 10458
1. By ethics I mean the code of morality which is to decide what is right and
wrong. This paper discusses ethics as related to profits, markets, consumers and phy-
sicians, in the context of the health sector and the economy as a whole.
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I. The Ethics of Profits in the Context of Market Efficiency
Ethics can be thought to apply to both the means by which
healthcare resources are allocated and to the end result of the allo-
cation. This section lays out this dual analysis of ethics as it relates
to profits and market efficiency. The next section looks at ethics
with regard to market incomes and poverty.
A. The Ethical Base of Markets as a Process
From the perspective of viewing ethics as a process (a means to
an end), markets would seem to be ethically neutral. Markets use
profits to reward producers for supplying the output that is de-
manded. The output demanded can be "good" or "bad." The mar-
ket functions equally well in either case. Profit can be earned from
producing a drug that cures cancer just the same as it can be earned
from tobacco that causes cancer. It is up to society, not market
forces, to set the legal and social environment in which the market
operates.
B. The Ethical Base of Markets as an End Result
In the introduction I mentioned the role of the profit motive as a
reward system. From the viewpoint of ethics related to the out-
come itself, we need to ask what exactly is being rewarded. The
answer reveals the ultimate value judgment that underlies the mar-
ket system, because everything is to be validated by the assumption
that the individual is the best judge of his or her welfare. This indi-
vidualistic ethic is called the assumption of "consumer sover-
eignty." Under this assumption, the fact that the individual would
be willing to pay up to $x for something means that s/he is better
off by $x if the good or service goes to that individual.
Having established the basis of willingness to pay, it is straight-
forward to explain the main virtue of markets. What the individual
actually has to pay on a market (the market price that is the same
for all individuals) is usually much less than the maximum amount
that the individual is willing to pay. The excess of what a person is
willing to pay over what they have to pay is called "consumer's
surplus."'2 Economic theorists have devised theorems that can
demonstrate that at market equilibrium, one is maximizing the to-
2. Alfred Marshall was one of the first to explain the theory of consumer's sur-
plus. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 103-14 (8th ed. 1920).
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tal possible consumer surplus.3 This is what is meant by the claim
that competitive markets are "efficient." Departures from the
market equilibrium caused, for example, by government price con-
trols, would be inefficient because they would cause a reduction of
the consumer surplus.
Gavin H. Mooney argues that for consumer sovereignty to be
valid, three questions must be answered in the affirmative:
(i) Are individuals able to judge their own welfare?
(ii) Do individuals accept that they are the best judge of their
own welfare?
(iii) Do individuals want to make the appropriate judgments? 4
We will discuss each of these questions in turn.
1. Are Individuals Able to Judge Their Own Welfare?
The assumption that the individual is the best judge of his or her
own welfare is clearly a bad one given all the social problems that
occur daily, such as crime, life threatening sexual practices, un-
healthy eating habits, and parental abuse. This assumption, how-
ever, still may be the best one given the alternatives. If the
individual is not the best judge, then who is? Not many people in
the United States and in the West generally are willing to accept
that the government knows better. This does not mean that there
will be no role for the government in the economy; only that the
government must (a) act as "referee" for individuals as they decide
their own interests in the marketplace and (b) correct any market
imperfections that may exist.
While this limited role for the government can be accepted for
most goods, is it valid for health care? Of course, to the extent that
market imperfections are rife in health care, the government's role
may not be so limited. What about the area of serious mental ill-
ness, where the assumption of consumer sovereignty can clearly be
questioned? A person with hallucinations and delusions is not in a
position to make rational economic choices. In addition, persons
with serious mental health problems are less likely to be in paid
employment and therefore more likely to be indigent. For exam-
ple, average annual earnings for someone with schizophrenia were
3. This is the basis of the second efficiency theorem of Welfare Economics. See,
e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 2-4 (1988).
4. See GAVIN H. MOONEY, ECONOMICS, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 60-61
(1986).
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only $10,7611 in a national survey of mental illness and only 43.4
percent were employed.6
In any one year, the number of people with schizophrenia and
affective disorders (such as depression) may not be large. How-
ever, we need to add to that number those with alcohol and drug
dependency. Moreover, lifetime prevalence rates are significant
for serious mental illness. For example, one in every five or six
Americans will suffer (severe) depression some time during their
lifetime. 7 Effective treatments for depression do exist. Many peo-
ple with depression, however, do not seek treatment by a trained
mental health professional. Markets cannot function properly
when consumers are not aware of (or deny) their demand for a
good or service.
2. Do Individuals Accept That They Are the Best Judge?
Even if the individual is the best judge, s/he may not be in the
best position to judge what should be decided. The more complete
statement of the consumer sovereignty assumption is that well-in-
formed individuals are the best judges of their own welfare. The
problem in health care is not just that consumers are not well-in-
formed. For example, outcomes are not always known and much
uncertainty abounds for the consumer. Rather the issue is one of
asymmetric information. 8 Doctors are trained to know more about
health outcomes and alternative treatment options than consum-
ers. In this context, as is also the case when individuals get in-
volved with the legal system, individuals need an agent to help
them further their interests. The agent that individuals usually rely
on in the healthcare field is the physician. Consumers here accept
that the doctor is the best judge of the individual's welfare.
5. Epidemiological Catchment Area Study (1981-1983), cited in D.M. O'Neill &
D.N. Bertollo, Work and Earnings Losses Due to Mental Illness: Some Broad Per-
spectives from Three National Surveys (1997) (unpublished paper presented at the
Sixth National Conference on State Mental Health Agency Services Research, on file
with the author).
6. O'Neill & Bertollo, supra note 5, at 18.
7. See Jeffrey H. Boyd & Myrna M. Weissman, Epidemiology of Affective Disor-
ders, 38 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1039, 1041 (1981) (estimating lifetime prevalence
rates for depression to be between 9-20 percent). But see Myrna M. Weissman & J.K.
Myers, Rates and Risks of Depressive Symptoms in a United States Urban Community,
57 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 219 (1978) (estimating rates of 16-20
percent).
8. For the pioneering paper on the problem of asymmetric information, see
George A. Akerlof, The Market For "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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The doctor-as-agent relationship with their patients fundamen-
tally strikes at the heart of the market mechanism. The "invisible
hand" property guaranteeing market efficiency, whereby consum-
ers are separate entities from producers and each follows their own
interests independently, interacting only through the price mecha-
nism, is now absent. If the producer is to be the consumer too, how
can one ensure that the doctor is going to be a reliable agent, and
not demand unnecessary treatments just because they will increase
physician profits? The issue of "supplier-induced demand" is a
heavily researched area in health economics.9 The jury is still out
as to what extent this actually takes place.
Ethics, and not just efficiency, is at stake with the agency rela-
tionship. This time it is the ethics of the physician that is involved.
The medical profession from the outset has recognized the physi-
cian's dilemma and its intended resolution was embodied in the
physician's Hippocratic oath: a physician must "so far as possible,
do no harm." The profession set out to pre-empt the situation by
ensuring that professional standards be adhered to, whereby pa-
tient interests are given priority over the physician's personal inter-
ests. This is one characteristic, first identified by Kenneth J.
Arrow,' ° that makes health care different from most other goods.
The expected behavior of the producer is that self-interest is to be
subordinate to professional standards of appropriate care. By con-
trast, one does not expect that a used car salesman will give an
accurate description of the product offered.
Markets are also threatened in a second way by information
asymmetries in health care; this time when the consumer knows
more than the producer. The existence of uncertainty is not in it-
self a cause of market failure. The desire to reduce uncertainty
simply sets up a demand for insurance. If there is a one in 1,000
chance of someone contracting AIDS and a year of AIDS treat-
ment costs $500,000, then an actuarially fair insurance policy (one
that ignored administrative costs of writing the policy and suffi-
ciently covered the expected claims) would set a premium of $500
per year. The individual may in fact know they have AIDS, how-
ever, while the insurance company only knows the national
9. The origins of supplier-induced demand can be found in Max Shain & Milton
I. Roemer, Hospital Costs Relate to the Supply of Beds, 92 MOD. HosP. 71 (1959),
cited in SHERMAN FOLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH & HEALTH CARE
205-206 (1993).
10. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REV. 941, 949-51 (1963).
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probabilities. The end result is likely to be that only those with
AIDS are willing to pay the premium. For every insured person,
the premium is $500, the claim is $500,000, and the insurance com-
pany goes bankrupt. This so-called "adverse selection" would
mean that private markets would be unable to satisfy the desire for
insurance and some form of market intervention would be
required."a
One interesting implication of the asymmetric information prob-
lem involves an explanation for why private non-profit organiza-
tions are so prevalent in the healthcare field.12 Take the case of
nursing homes. A person with a single elderly parent is consider-
ing what nursing home to choose for the parent. Often there is no
point'in asking the patient what home to go to because s/he would
say that none of the homes offered were suitable (in order to avoid
going to a home). Clearly, this violates consumer sovereignty. The
focus here, however, is not on the validity of the consumer sover-
eignty principle, but the consequence of its non-adherence. This
non-adherence would cause an information problem to the family
member making the nursing home decision. The son or daughter
will probably never really know what it is like for the parent to be
in a particular nursing residence because s/he will not be living
there. The suspicion will be that a home seeking to maximize prof-
its may try to take advantage of the fact that the payer has limited
information and provide low-quality, low-cost care at high prices.
A non-profit home, on the other hand, may be thought to have less
of an incentive to cut corners, and therefore be more trustworthy.
3. Do Individuals Want to Make the Appropriate Judgments?
Assume that the individual has the mental facility to make mar-
ket decisions and that s/he is fully informed. Could it still be ra-
tional for the individual to surrender decision-making authority to
someone else? In the healthcare field, there are reasons to believe
this proposition. Many decisions are of a life or death nature. For
such decisions, just going through the calculus of comparing bene-
fits with costs can cause much stress and unpleasantness for the
individual. For example, the decision whether to pull the plug on a
life support system for a brain-dead loved one is not one that eve-
11. The problem of adverse selection follows directly from the asymmetric infor-
mation problem identified by Akerlof. See Akerlof, supra note 8, at 490-94.
12. The theory distinguishing for-profits from non-profits on this basis was devel-
oped by David Easley and Maureen O'Hara. See David Easley & Maureen O'Hara,
The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm, 14 BELL J. ECON. 531 (1983).
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ryone wants to make. It may be far easier to ask the doctor in-
stead: "What would you do in my position?" or even say: "Do
whatever you think is best."
To summarize, when individuals are not able, willing, or knowl-
edgeable enough to be the best judge of their own welfare, which is
often the case in the healthcare field, either physicians or the gov-
ernment must step in and intervene in the market mechanism.
H. The Ethics of Profits and its Relation to Poverty
Although economists usually characterize the market mecha-
nism as working through the profit motive, it is in fact more accu-
rate to talk about the market mechanism as a wage determining
system because employee compensation is around 73 percent of
national income in the United States.13 The ethical base, however,
is virtually the same as with profits. One can again argue that high
wages are the reward for producing goods that consumers want.
To make the point a different way, economists say that the demand
for labor is derived from the demand by consumers for the goods
that labor is being used to produce. The only difference between
the two types of rewards is that profits involve some risk-taking,
whereby the firm needs to anticipate what consumers want.
A. The Ethical Base of Market Income as a Process
Economists, especially those from the "Chicago School," con-
sider the market process as being far more ethically neutral than
government intervention in the income generating process. 14 If
the weather is bad one year, this would cause farm incomes to fall.
This misfortune cannot be blamed on anyone. If farm incomes are
low because the government banned agriculture exports, however,
this would not have been an unavoidable loss and, in this sense,
would be considered an unfair process. That is to say, incomes de-
termined either randomly or in response to consumer preferences
are much more acceptable than incomes that are set arbitrarily by
government decree.
What is assumed up to this point is that markets are competitive.
In such markets, firms can expect to receive in the long run a re-
turn that is just sufficient to keep them in business. However,
when markets have, for example, a single seller (a monopoly),
13. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMIN., STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 449 (Table No. 693) (Oct. 1996).
14. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 22-36 (1962).
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which is often assumed to be the case with physicians' activities,
the seller can earn excess returns that do not disappear over time.
Monopolies, therefore, are inequitable as well as inefficient be-
cause they keep output below optimal levels in order to raise prices
and obtain excess profits.
B. The Ethical Base of Markets Income as an End Result
Low income may be a penalty for not satisfying consumers, but
may also result from completely unrelated reasons (e.g., econo-
mists usually stress the existence of monopoly, bad luck, lack of
inheritance, and discrimination). On top of this, there is the simple
fact of life that some are sick and disabled and thus unable to seek
paid employment.
The problem of low incomes would seem to be another manifes-
tation of uncertainty, with insurance again being the remedy.
However, as we saw above with the adverse selection problem that
prevents private health insurance from operating, private markets
cannot provide income insurance when would-be insurers have
some control over whether their incomes are low or not (by not
working or getting fired). If markets cannot provide income insur-
ance, then the government must get involved (by using the tax-
transfer system). What then would be the ethical base for this
intervention?
The justification for the government's redistribution of incomes
would, at heart, be exactly the same as was used to justify market
outcomes as related to goods and services (i.e., consumer sover-
eignty). Individuals have preferences about the incomes and con-
sumption of others (i.e., the poor) just as they care about their own
income and consumption. If the individual is the best judge of his/
her welfare, then this distribution preference should be recognized.
1. Consumer Response to Poverty in the Context of Health Care
Consumer preferences about the poor have policy relevance
through voluntary contributions. However, for these contributions
to take place on a significant scale, a collective and non-market
way of doing this must be undertaken. Private charities can oper-
ate, but they usually will not be efficient.
Assume that an individual taxpayer values one dollar's worth of
income that he/she receives to be worth $1. If that person values
$1 given to a poor person as worth, perhaps, $1.50, then the indi-
vidual would be happy to contribute to a private charity. For every
dollar transferred, the rich person gets $1.50 worth of "psychic"
674
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satisfaction, gives up $1 worth of personal income, and has a net
gain of $.50. Transferring income privately would make the rich
person better off.
When the psychic satisfaction is as strong as just considered, then
government intervention would be unnecessary. More realistically,
let us assume that the rich get only $.01 worth of satisfaction for
every dollar received by the poor (and continue to assume that
they value a dollar to themselves as worth $1). Now, transferring a
dollar privately would not be worthwhile, as there would be a net
loss of $.99 for every $1 transferred. What the private solution ig-
nores is that every rich person gets the psychic satisfaction of $1
transferred to the poor, even if some other rich person does the
donating. Economists would call the dollar transferred a "pure
public good," one that is equally consumed by all. This means that
everyone consumes each unit of the good simultaneously (e.g., an
early warning missile detector for one U.S. citizen is also a missile
detector for everyone else living in the U.S.), which is unlike a pri-
vate good, such as bread (where if I consume a loaf of bread, and
you consume a loaf, we must have two loaves to satisfy both our
demands). Thus, if there are 101 rich persons, and each values the
dollar transferred to the poor at $.01, then aggregate benefits
would be $1.01, the cost would be $1, and the transfer would poten-
tially be worthwhile because the net gain would be $.01.
Although transfers would be worthwhile, they would not take
place without government involvement. Each rich person has a ra-
tional' incentive to under-reveal his or her preferences and try to
get a "free ride" (get the benefit and leave others to do the paying/
transferring). The solution is that each rich person would vote for
every rich person to be taxed $1, including him/herself, and in the
process, each would be better off. The taxes would be voluntarily
imposed and would not require government coercion.
Note that this argument for public provision would be true for
other goods also, such as national defense or the preservation of
endangered species, where the equal consumption property ex-
isted. In all cases, the desire to get a free ride means that markets
fail completely. When people do not pay the price, profits cannot
be earned, and no output will be forthcoming. Within the health-
care field it would particularly apply to public health (e.g., to justify
public inoculation programs). What does not follow from this ar-
gument for public provision, however, is public production. Pri-
vately owned laboratories can develop and produce serums on par
1997] 675
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with publicly owned laboratories as long as they receive the tax
revenues from the government as payment for the services.
This argument explains why income redistribution would be de-
sirable and can account for programs such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children ("AFDC"). 5 It also can be adapted slightly
to explain why the poor in the United States today get most of
their assistance in-kind.1 6 For example, the government provides
Medicaid and does not give cash assistance to pay for the health
care of the poor. Assume that the rich care how the poor get
assistance. One dollar's worth of assistance to the .poor could be
spent on something that does not give the rich any psychic satisfac-
tion, such as alcohol or illegal drugs. If the rich want the poor to
get food, education, and health care, then cash transfers would be
inefficient (the rich as a group would be better off if the poor are
assisted in-kind).
To see some empirical support for the claim that government in-
tervention is necessary for income redistribution, refer to a recent
study of the sources of income for homeless people by Cheryl
Zlotnick and Marjorie J. Robertson. 7 The median income was
$376 from any source for a sample of 564 homeless people in Cali-
fornia, 8 only 266 of whom had neither a major mental nor a sub-
stance disorder.' 9 The main sources of income were from work,
entitlement programs, and other sources.2 0 There were three pri-
vate voluntary sources: panhandling, gifts from relatives, and gifts
from friends.2a Most homeless people did not get income from
these sources, and when they did, the amounts received were
small.22 Thus, 104 received a median income of $30 as gifts from
relatives; 94 received a median of $20 as gifts from friends; and 82
received a median of $10 from panhandling.3 On the other hand,
15. See Larry L. Orr, Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application to
AFDC, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 369-70 (1976).
16. For the redistribution in-kind argument see H.M. Hochman & J.D. Rodgers, Is
Efficiency a Criterion for Judging Redistribution?, 26 PUB. FIN. 76 (1971).
17. See Cheryl Zlotnick & Marjorie J. Robertson, Sources of Income Among
Homeless Adults With Major Mental Disorders or Substance Use Disorders, 47 Psy-
CHIATRIC SERVICES 147 (1996).
18. Id. at 149, 151.
19. Id. at 148-50 (Tables 1-3).
20. Id. at 149 (Table 2).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 150.
23. Id.
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entitlement programs provided the most monthly income ($340)
and was the second most common source (for 243 individuals).24
The Zlotnick and Robertson study also highlights the fact that, in
order to get government assistance, someone had to act as an agent
for those with severe mental illness or substance abuse. Those with
either (or both) of these disorders were four to nine times more
likely to report entitlement income if they had received case man-
agement services in the previous month.
2. Producer Response to Poverty in the Context of Health Care
Traditionally, markets in health care have had their own way of
resolving the conflict between profits and the needs of the poor.
The markets have deviated from the "law of one price." Instead,
price discrimination was rife, whereby different consumers were
charged different prices for the same good. In order to satisfy the
physician's Hippocratic oath, which requires that all sick people be
treated, the rich were charged prices well above costs in order to
provide a margin which could subsidize free care for the poor.
However, with the advent of attempts to increase efficiency in
health care, fee schedules were set by the government which elimi-
nated the margin that made cross-subsidization possible. In the
early 1980's, Medicare introduced a payment system for hospitals
that assigned a standard rate for a specific procedure or service.
All services were set out as categories ("Diagnostic Related
Groups," or "DRG's") and a rate for each category was listed
based on what that service cost on average in the past. Thus, if a
hernia typically involved two days hospitalization and a battery of
associated tests and services totaling $1000, then this would be the
sum that Medicare would compensate the hospital for any new pa-
tient with a hernia condition. The motivation was to reduce any
test or length of hospital stay thought to be unnecessary; any ser-
vice provision above the norm for the area would be borne at the
hospital's expense. The unintended effect was that the cross-subsi-
dization which occurred earlier would no longer be possible.
Government policy has also been strongly behind the develop-
ment of health maintenance organizations ("HMO's"). These or-
ganizations use a capitation system for charging patients, whereby
a fixed fee per person is set and all care is to be covered for that
one payment. Just like the DRG at the hospital level, the capita-
24. Id.
25. Id. at 151.
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tion fee for physician services replaced the previous fee-for-service
system and fixed a limit to healthcare costs. The increase in effi-
ciency again limited the physician's ability to cross-subsidize the
poor by charging higher fees for the rich.
Separate from government initiatives, market forces have also
been working in the same direction. Increased competition, as
measured by the number of firms in an industry, is thought by
economists to lower prices and profits and thus increase efficiency.
Increased competition, therefore, can be expected to reduce the
possibility of subsidizing the poor's services. With so many public
and non-profit firms in health care, it is interesting that this expec-
tation of lower cross-subsidization with greater competition was
found also in the healthcare field, as we now see.
In many areas, the only source of outpatient care for the poor
and the uninsured suffering from serious mental illness are the
Community Mental Health Centers ("CMHC's"), which had
grown to about 2,200 in the United States by 1989.26 Robin E.
Clark, Robert A. Dorwart, and Mark Schlesinger looked at a sam-
ple of 430 such multi-service agencies in 1992 (68 percent were
nonprofits, 28 percent were publicly owned, and 4 percent were
for-profits). 27 The output of concern (one of three dependent vari-
ables) was the number of below-cost visits. The competition mea-
sure was the number of community facilities per 100,000 of the
population (a service area was a county where 10 percent or more
of an agency's patients lived).28 The main result was that, the
greater the number of community facilities, the lower the number
of below-cost visits. 29
What is particularly revealing about this study was the set of
variables that were not statistically significant. It did not matter
whether the agency was. publicly owned or not.30 More impor-
tantly, the number of non-community facilities had no effect on the
number of below-cost visits. 31 Thus, the number of HMO's per
100,000 and the number of psychiatrists per 100,000 were not com-
petitors for the community facilities serving the really needy.
26. See Robin E. Clark et al., Competition, Market Structure and Community
Mental Health Agencies 1 (1992) (unpublished paper presented to the National
Council of Community Mental Health Centers, on file with the author).
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 13.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id.
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On the other hand, for indicators of need, the study used per
capita income and the percentage of the population living in urban
areas32 (epidemiological studies find that urban areas have higher
incidences of mental illness). For both variables, the higher the in-
dicator of need, the greater the number of visits at prices below
costs (both variables were statistically significant). 33
Conclusion
It is not profits per se that are the defining value judgment be-
hind how markets operate. Rather, the key assumption is that the
individual is the best judge of his/her welfare. We have presented
many reasons for doubting the validity of consumer sovereignty in
health care. Consumer sovereignty, however, is not an all or noth-
ing imperative. First, one can accept consumer sovereignty in some
areas and not others. This is what is implied by saying that a legal
framework must be set for markets. Individuals are then free to
eat themselves sick, but they are not allowed to buy child pornog-
raphy. Second, one can accept consumer sovereignty for some
people and not for others. This is a most difficult issue which
would seem to have fundamentally undemocratic undertones, but
it is an inescapable fact for some people, especially the seriously
mentally ill.
One dimension that really blurs the consumer sovereignty issue
is the impact of age. At the upward limit, the elderly are more
likely to have Alzheimer's disease than the young, so serious
mental illness may be present. However, there are also physical
disabilities that are not always acknowledged by the individuals
themselves, but nonetheless require care. At the lower limit, we
have the young who are forced to go to school. We do not ask a
seven year old if they want to go to school today and rather play
instead. Again the legal system gets involved and sets the rules. It
says that at eighteen you can make your own decisions, but not
beforehand. The unanswered question is what occurs during the
eleventh hour of the 364th day of being seventeen that solves the
consumer sovereignty issue.
The need for efficiency in health care is incontrovertible. As
Gavin H. Mooney writes:
It is not a question of Ethics or Economics. Without a wider use
of economics in health care inefficiencies will abound and deci-
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 12-13.
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sions will be made less explicitly and hence less rationally than is
desirable: we go on spending large sums to save lives in one way
when similar lives in greater numbers could be saved in another
way. The price of inefficiency, inexplicitness and irrationality in
health care is paid in death and sickness.34
But, the problem is that markets are not always efficient in
health care. We have seen that the asymmetry of information be-
tween buyers and sellers causes market failure. Government inter-
vention is sometimes necessary to provide the finances for the
markets to exist in the first place. This is especially so for pure
public goods where private markets fail completely. Remember
also that it is only competitive markets that are efficient. When
competition is absent or diverted, markets need not be efficient.
Aside from issues of efficiency, we have the inherent problem
that markets do not automatically respond to the poor. They re-
spond to willingness to pay, as constrained by an individual's ability
to pay. One could argue that, in order for markets to accurately
reflect individual preferences, incomes should not be so unequal
that ability to pay completely swamps willingness to pay. Income
redistribution is almost a prerequisite for effectively functioning
markets.
If redistribution is required, who is to do the redistributing?
Again we are left with the conclusion that it cannot be left to vol-
untary (private charity) processes. Markets cannot always redis-
tribute income efficiently. Voluntarily imposed taxes by the rich
are often needed as part of a collective redistribution agreement.
While redistribution has traditionally taken place within the
healthcare system by virtue of the physician's desire to treat every-
one who is sick, competition has discouraged this behavior. The
reduction in the ability of providers to cross-subsidize health serv-
ices for the poor due to recent policy changes means that universal
health insurance coverage is now more necessary. This point is
worth stating in a different way.
Previously, healthcare markets did accommodate the poor. With
increased competition from DRG's, HMO's, and even community
agencies, the ability to accommodate the poor has been reduced.
In particular, in mental health, there exists a "Two-Class System"
of care. A 1994 study of inpatient admissions at hospitals in
34. MOONEY, supra note 4, at 90.
35. See Ethan B. Minkin et al., An Analysis of the Two-Class System of Care in
Public and Private Psychiatric Hospitals, 45 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 975
(1994).
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Maryland found that minorities, men, the uninsured, the unem-
ployed, and those with the severest cases of mental illness (schizo-
phrenia) were much more likely to be admitted by the public
hospitals.36 Any healthcare reform must ask the question whether
"public and private hospital systems are prepared to treat new and
different populations" than they are currently.
37
Since there is this tension between efficiency and providing for
the poor in health care, we must first recognize this conflict and
then try to get policy makers to articulate the "trade-off" between
these two social objectives. That is, policy choices that involve the
benefit of increased access at the cost of reduced efficiency can
only be determined if one knows what the relative weights are for
the two objectives.38
36. Id. at 976.
37. Id. at 975.
38. The trade-offs are given practical expression by attaching different distribution
weights to the effects accruing to different income groups. For a survey of schools on
distribution weights see Robert J. Brent, Use of Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Survey of Schools, 12 PUB. FIN. QUARTERLY 213 (1984).
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